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Abstract
During the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve implemented two monetary
policies: cutting interest rates and quantitative easing (QE). I develop a model
to examine these two policies in a frictional financial environment. In this model,
agents sell assets to acquire money when a consumption opportunity arises, which
can only be done through over-the-counter (OTC) markets. In equilibrium, when
the interest rate is low (not necessarily zero), households who trade in OTC mar-
kets achieve their optimal consumption. When the interest rate is high, QE will
raise asset prices and lower households’ consumption. The asset price increase
indicates a higher liquidity premium, which reflects inefficiency in money reallo-
cation.
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1 Introduction
OTC markets are large asset markets in which agents search, perform bilateral trade,
and bargain. Many assets are traded in OTC markets.1 Therefore, it is of interest
to study how these markets work and how policy affects these markets. Because of
search and matching frictions in OTC markets, some OTC trades occur with the help
of intermediaries, such as financial brokers and dealers. Due to limited commitment
or lack of record keeping among these agents, many OTC markets require assets to
facilitate transactions.
OTC markets play an important role in reallocating money.2 In OTC markets,
agents transfer money to those who need it most, increasing liquidity and welfare
in the economy. However, OTC markets have suffered due to a scarcity of assets (Ca-
ballero 2006; Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2006), that has worsened since the Great
Recession (Gorton and Ordonez 2013, 2014). During the crisis, many private assets,
such as mortgage-backed securities, have not been accepted in OTC markets. OTC
markets are inefficient at reallocating money, and as a result, market liquidity is lim-
ited. To increase market liquidity, the Federal Reserve employs two monetary policies:
cutting nominal interest rates and quantitative easing (QE). QE is a new policy. To ac-
complish QE, the Federal Reserve simultaneously increases the level of money in the
economy and decreases the level of assets. The traditional wisdom of monetary eco-
nomics states that this is an effective monetary policy because increasing the level of
money raises real money balances.3 However, I want to reinvestigate this idea through
a model using relatively firm microfoundations for money, liquidity, and assets.
1“Many assets, such as mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, government bonds, US federal
funds, emerging-market debt, bank loans, swaps and many other derivatives, private equity and real
estate are traded in ... (OTC) markets. Traders in these markets search for counterparties, incurring
opportunity or other costs. When counterparties meet, their bilateral relationship is strategic, prices are
set through a bargaining process that reflects each investor’s alternatives to immediate trade.” (Duffie
et al. 2007, emphasis added)
2Reallocation of money in OTC markets has not been well studied. Many OTC papers (Duffie et al.
2005, 2007, Lagos and Rocheteau 2009, Chiu and Koppel 2011, and Lagos et al. 2011) trade assets for
goods, instead of money in their models.
3The traditional IS-LM model and other relatively modern market segmentation models state that
the level of money affects allocations. See Bernanke et al. (1999) for traditional models. Examples of
market segmentation models are Alvarez et al. (2001, 2009, 2014) and Chiu (2014). These papers study
CIA (cash-in-advance) models. See Kahn (2006) for a broader review.
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I study the effects of interest rates and QE in a general equilibrium model with
OTC markets and middlemen. The interest rate policy is to alter the growth rate of the
money supply, which is equivalent to the inflation rate and, hence, the nominal interest
rate on illiquid assets determined by the Fisher equation. The other policy is QE, which
involves changing the level of money and assets in circulation. The main contribution
of this paper is the new findings regarding QE. The factor that affects allocations is
the asset levels in circulation, rather than the level of money.4 The main point is that,
with flexible prices, changing the level of money has no effect on consumption and
welfare. This point reflects the classical neutrality of money. However, the level of
assets in circulation is significant to allocations. Assume that assets are not sufficiently
abundant to satisfy the agents.5 Given that assets are the medium of exchange in OTC
transactions, a decrease in assets will make OTC markets less efficient at reallocating
money—thus actually decreasing consumption, liquidity, and welfare. This finding is
new. If the Federal Reserve wants to increase liquidity in the economy, it should sell
assets, instead of buying them.
Another contribution of the study is the new findings regarding monetary poli-
cies on asset pricing. In frictionless models, assets are priced fundamentally, which
means asset prices reflect only the discounted stream of dividends. However, in OTC
markets, assets are not only stores of value but also a medium of exchange. When
the asset supply is not sufficiently large, assets will be priced above the fundamen-
tal price and carry a liquidity premium. This paper studies the effects of these two
monetary policies on the liquidity premium. The effects of inflation (equivalent to the
nominal interest rate) are as follows: Inflation will increase the demand for assets in
OTC markets and lead to a higher premium. But asset prices do not always increase
with inflation. When inflation is extremely high, money suppliers on OTC markets
carry such little cash that only a few assets are sufficient to acquire all the money in
4The finding that the money level has no effect holds in Williamson (2012, 2014a, 2014b) under
different assumptions. In Williamson’s papers, agents use banks rather than OTC markets to trade.
This finding is also established in Rocheteau et al. (2014), which similarly does not look at the case of
OTC markets.
5See Caballero (2006), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), and Gorton and Ordonez (2013, 2014)
for the scarcity of safe assets.
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OTC markets; then assets are priced fundamentally again. The effect of QE increases
the scarcity of assets in OTC markets and leads to higher asset prices. However, this
higher price signifies a tighter liquidity constraint.
This model uses three fundamental factors: OTC markets, middlemen, and mone-
tary policies. The OTC markets section follows Duffie et al. (2005, 2007) and captures
two important and realistic characteristics: (a) search and bargaining, and (b) the use
of inter-dealer markets to facilitate trade. Middlemen are useful for two reasons. First,
they increase the trade probability and the market volume (Rubinstein and Wolinsky
1987; Wright and Wong 2014); second, they make money allocation more efficient.
My paper is also related to a strand of monetary literature that supports the agents’
ability to rebalance their money holdings when a consumption or investment oppor-
tunity arises (Berentsen et al. 2007; Berentsen and Waller, 2011; Boel and Camera 2006;
Kocherlakota 2003; Li and Li 2013).6 Considerable literature exists relating to mon-
etary policy and search; therefore, I put three surveys here: Williamson and Wright
(2010), Nosal and Rocheteau (2011), and Lagos et al. (2014).
Three recent papers are highly related to my work: Mattesini and Nosal (2013),
Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2012), and Lagos and Zhang (2013). Similar to the
method described in this paper, they embed an OTC financial market in a mone-
tary model. Mattesini and Nosal (2013) state that entrepreneurs have heterogeneous
money demand and trade in OTC markets via dealers only, whereas Geromichalos
and Herrenbrueck (2012) portray a scenario in which buyers and sellers trade without
dealers in the OTC financial market. Lagos and Zhang (2013) state that money is used
to buy assets on the OTC market. The authors of all of these papers specify that as-
sets carry a liquidity premium, and they also discuss the effects of changing inflation.
However, none of these papers focuses on the effects of QE.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the environment and the
6Some of these papers use assets as collateral, following Kiyotaki-Moore (1997, 2005), whereas others
use assets as media of exchange, following Kiyotaki-Wright (1989, 1993). Ferraris and Watanabe (2008,
2011) discuss the relationship between these two styles. Under certain assumptions, He et al. (2014)
show that they are mathematically equivalent. In my paper, it does not matter whether assets are used
as collateral or as a medium of exchange. I use assets as a medium of exchange to simplify my model.
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characteristics of markets. Section 3 derives the value functions of agents and solves
the general equilibrium model. The relationship between policies and liquidity is an-
alyzed in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the findings of this research and offers
recommendations for how the Federal Reserve should set monetary policy.
2 The Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each time period contains three submarkets:
an OTC financial market, a decentralized goods market (DM), and a frictionless cen-
tralized market (CM). There are two types of agents: a unit measure of households H
and a measure ξ of middlemen M. H trades with another H in OTC markets or via the
third party M.
There are two types of goods, x and q, both of which are perishable: x is a CM good
and is produced with labor linearly, and q is produced and traded on the DM, where
the cost is c(q) with c′(q) > 0, and c”(q) > 0.7 H’s preferences are U(x)− L + u(q)−
c(q˜), where q˜ is the quantity of DM goods that H produces for others. This quasi-linear
preference setup is important for tractability. H could buy x with credit, labor, money,
or assets. There are no restrictions on how to pay for x, whereas H can only use money
to buy q. The variable q∗ is the optimal q consumption that satisfies u′(q∗) = c′(q∗). M
represents brokers who trade on behalf of H and receive service fees in terms of x; M
does not work or hold assets and consumes x with linear preferences.
There are two kinds of assets: money m and real assets a. The quantity of money
Mt grows at rate µ, and Mt+1 = (1+ µ)Mt. Money is injected or withdrawn by lump-
sum transfers. In the model, I use mt for H’s money holding. φ represents the amount
of x that one unit of money buys, and zt = φmt denotes real money balances of the
date t (measured in terms of CM goods). In a steady state, µ is also the inflation
7I interpret q as consumption goods (Lagos and Wright 2005; Rocheteau and Wright 2005); however,
q can also be interpreted as inputs of productions (Silveira and Wright 2010; Mattesini and Nosal 2013),
in which case u(q) stands for the profit function of firms, not the utility function of households. Then
agents need to reallocate money when an investment opportunity, rather than a consumption opportu-
nity, arises.
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rate, φt+1/φt = 1+ µ. Given the inflation rate µ, the nominal interest rate i on illiquid
assets is determined by the Fisher equation: 1+ i = (1+ µ)/β , where β is the discount
factor. Therefore, changing the money growth rate, or the inflation rate, is equivalent
to changing the nominal interest rate on illiquid assets. In this paper, i is a policy
variable.
Another policy variable is the amount of assets in circulation, A. The total supply
of assets, A¯, is fixed. And A¯ = A+ Ag, where Ag is in the hands of the government. Ag
is not used in market transactions. When the government performs QE, it decreases
the level of assets, A, and increases the level of money, Mt. In my model, Mt has no
effect on allocations due to flexible prices.
Agent H requires money to purchase the DM good, q; it accumulates money and
asset balances in the CM. Then H brings assets and money to the OTC market. Upon
entering the OTC market, H receives a preference shock and determines whether it has
a consumption opportunity in the next DM. H becomes a buyer B or a nonbuyer N.
Agents B and N have heterogeneous money demand. B receives consumption oppor-
tunities and would like to have greater money holdings and fewer real assets, whereas
N would like to hold more assets and less money. B and N search randomly on the
OTC market to rebalance their money and assets holdings. B could meet N to trade
bilaterally, or trade with a third party M, or with no one at all if no meeting occurs.
Similarly, N could trade with B, trade with M, or make no trade. After trade occurs in
the OTC market, B enters the DM to purchase q with m. All households then reenter
the CM to consume, rebalance m and a, and so on. More formally, in period t-1, H exits
the CM with m and a. At the beginning of period t, H enters the OTC market, and the
following sequence of events occurs:
1. Each H receives a preference shock and determines whether it will act as B or N.
2. B and N search to reallocate m and a. B may meet N, M, or neither. N may meet
B, M, or neither. The OTC market ends.
3. B brings m and enters the DM to buy; N enters the DM to sell and produce.
4. B and N go to the CM in period t. They consume, work, clear their debt, and
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move to the next OTC.
Figure 1 shows the timeline.
Figure 1: Timeline
Among the three submarkets, CM is frictionless, whereas the DM and the OTC
market are frictional. The DM has search, recognizability, and commitment frictions.
The OTC market has search and record-keeping frictions. Let me describe the DM
frictions first. Following Lagos and Wright (2005), the DM is a search and matching
goods market. Each household produces heterogeneous DM goods q. Buyers search
for their personal q. If B finds a q that fulfills its needs, B and N will trade. However, B
cannot use credit in this trade due to the lack of commitment and therefore, it must use
some assets to pay for q. Here, only one asset, money, can be recognized. The reason
is that claims to assets can be counterfeited with zero cost, whereas money cannot be
counterfeited; that is the recognizability friction.8 Generally speaking, DM frictions
generate money demand, and H needs to pay with money when acting as B.
OTC markets are search and matching financial markets. In the OTC market, H
does not have record-keeping technology. When N trades with counterparts, it does
not give credit because it cannot identify who received its money. In other words, if
B or M wants to acquire money from N, it must pay with assets. Assets serve as the
8Recognizability is a traditional assumption. An alternative assumption is that agents know assets
well but treat them asymmetrically. See Zhu and Wallace (2007), Nosal and Rocheteau (2013), and Hu
and Rocheteau (2013, 2014).
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medium of exchange on OTC markets, which is the key assumption of this paper.9
To summarize, H requires money because it may want to buy the DM goods, q;
however, H does not want to hold large sums of money due to inflation. Then, OTC
markets provide a chance to reallocate money between B and N, thereby increasing
liquidity and welfare. Assets are used as a medium of exchange in the OTC markets.
I use the following Figure 2 to explain OTC markets in greater detail.
Figure 2: The OTC market
Figure 2 shows how OTC trades function. The solid arrows represent the flow of
money, while the dashed arrows represent the flow of assets. There are two types of
trade depicted in Figure 2. In type 1, N trades with B, whereas in type 2, N and B trade
with M. To clarify, N and B do not trade using the same middleman. B and N meet
different Ms, then M makes trades in the inter-dealer market on behalf of its clients.
Case 3 exists in the OTC market, which is the “no trade” scenario in which B or N does
not meet a counterparty successfully.
The inter-dealer market is a key feature of the OTC market. Figure 3 illustrates
how this market works. As in Figure 3, the solid arrows represent the flow of money,
whereas the dashed arrows represent the flow of assets.
9This assumption seems realistic given that many OTC markets, such as repos and swaps, require
assets.
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Figure 3: Inter-dealer market
The inter-dealer market is competitive and Walrasian. In this market, M trades on
behalf of B or N, collecting fees for its services. However, these fees will not make
the reallocation of money less efficient because M can give credit to B on fees. Let d
denote the service fee debt. In contrast to H, M has record-keeping technology and
enforces the repayment on the next CM. M does not have money or asset holdings: M
is a broker. When M meets N to trade, M requires assets. Then M acquires assets from
other Ms, who collect assets from B. In the inter-dealer market, B’s asset holdings are
used to get N’s money, which is similar to the OTC trades without middlemen.
Another important characteristic of the inter-dealer market is that B is able to use
money from more than one N. The amount of money B receives depends on the B–N
ratio. All terms of trades in OTC markets are determined by bilateral bargaining. This
framework allows me to study the effects of changing i and A on liquidity, welfare,
and asset pricing.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Value functions
I begin by describing value functions in the CM, considering that H enters the CM
with m, a, and debt d; then Bellman’s equation is the following:
Vc(m, a, d) = max
x,L,mˆ,aˆ
{U(x)− L + βVo(mˆ, aˆ, 0)} (1)
st x = L + (ψ+ ρ)a + φm− ψaˆ− φmˆ− T − d, (2)
where Vcand Vo are the value functions for the CM and the OTC market. φ and ψ
are prices of money and assets respectively in terms of x. ρ is the dividend of one
unit of asset. T is the lump-sum taxes or transfers; T = Tr − φ(Mt+1 −Mt); that is, T
contains money transfers φ(Mt+1 −Mt) and real taxes Tr. H determines future asset
and money holdings, aˆ and mˆ; and H clears the debt, d, every period. Substituting the
budget equation into Bellman’s equation, three choice variables remain. The FOC are
found below:
x : U′(x) = 1;
mˆ : βVo1 (mˆ, aˆ, 0) = φ;
aˆ : βVo2 (mˆ, aˆ, 0) = ψ.
(3)
The above result is standard in models that build on Lagos and Wright (2005), in
which all Hs have the same x consumption; their money and asset holdings follow
Lemma 1.10
Lemma 1. mˆ, aˆ are history-independent.
Proof. See FOC (3).
After leaving the CM, H enters the next market, the OTC market. At the beginning
10It may be interesting to study the case where q is used to produce x; this generates an inflation-
employment trade-off for reasons similar to but different from Rocheteau et al. (2008), Dong (2011),
Berentson et al. (2011), and Aruoba et al. (2011); I leave this idea for further research.
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of the OTC market, H becomes B or N; the value function of the OTC market is
Vo(mˆ, aˆ, 0) = γVob (mˆ, aˆ, 0) + (1− γ)Von (mˆ, aˆ, 0), (4)
where Vob and V
o
n are the value functions for B and N, and γ and 1− γ are the proba-
bilities of turning into B and N respectively.
In the OTC market, B (who needs additional money) may be matched with N, M, or
nobody; therefore, two types of trades are possible. B is represented as type 1 or type
2 in these trades and as type 3 when there are no possible trades. Let α1b, α
2
b, and α
3
b
be the probabilities of the three types of B, whereas α1n, α2n, and α3n are the probabilities
for N. To simplify, assume one middleman is guaranteed to meet with at least one
buyer or one seller. This gives us the following results: α2b = ξγ, α
2
2 = ξ(1 − γ);
α1b = (1− ξ)m1(γ, 1− γ)/γ, α1n = (1− ξ)m1(γ, 1− γ)/(1− γ); and α3b = 1− α1b − α2b,
α3n = 1− α1n − α2n, where m1(γ, 1− γ) is the OTC markets’ matching function.
The following is B’s OTC value function:
Vob (mˆ,aˆ) = α
1
bV
d
b (mˆ+m1, aˆ− a1, 0)+ α2bVdb (mˆ+m2, aˆ− a2, d)+ (1− α1b− α2b)Vdb (mˆ, aˆ, 0),
(5)
where m1 and m2 are additional units of money that B obtains in type 1 and type
2 meetings, and a1 and a2 are assets that B sells in type 1 and type 2 meetings. d
represents the service fees that B must pay at the next CM. Vdb is B’s value function in
the next DM.
Similarly, N’s OTC value function is,
Von (mˆ, aˆ, 0) = α
1
s V
d
n (mˆ−m1, aˆ+ a1, 0)+ α2s Vdn (mˆ−m2, aˆ+ a2, 0)+ (1− α1s − α2s )Vdn (mˆ, aˆ, 0)
(6)
N has no debt.
Finally, I consider the value functions in the DM. B is a potential buyer, whereas N
is a potential seller. Let αb denote the probability that B makes a trade, and αn denote
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the probability that N makes a trade; m2(γ, 1− γ) denotes the DM matching function.
Then αb = m2(γ, 1− γ)/γ, and αn = m2(γ, 1− γ)/(1− γ). The DM value functions
for B and N are the following:
Vdb (m, a, d) = V
c(m, a, d) + αb[u(q)− φm] (7)
Vdn (m, a, 0) = V
c(m, a, 0) + αn[−c(q˜) + φm˜], (8)
where q˜ is the DM goods that N produces for B, and m˜ is the payment that N receives.
q˜ and m˜ are not N’s choice variables.
When B and N match successfully in the DM market, B consumes DM consump-
tion and pays with money, whereas N produces with cost and receives payment. The
amount of DM goods that N produces depends only on B’s money holding. Hav-
ing established the agent’s value functions, I will examine the DM and OTC market
bargaining processes.
3.2 DM bargaining
The DM opens after the OTC market; therefore, the terms of trade in this market will
serve as inputs to determine the terms of trade in the OTC market. Hence, I study the
DM first and then examine the OTC processes via backward induction.
In the DM, money is used to buy q. In a bilateral meeting, the terms of trade
(q, v(q)) are determined by bargaining. The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining process
is applied here:
max
q,v(q)
u(q)− c(q) (9)
st v(q) = θu(q) + (1− θ)c(q) ≤ φm, (10)
where θ is B’s bargaining power, and v(q) is the function of payment.
The solution to the bargaining problem is described in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Define the amount of money that allows a buyer to purchase q∗ (q∗ st, u′(q∗) =
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c′(q∗)) as m∗:
m∗ = θu(q
∗) + (1− θ)c(q∗)
φ
.
Then, the solution is as follows:
v(q) =
 m
∗ if m ≥ m∗,
m if m < m∗.
(11)
q =
 q
∗ if m ≥ m∗,
v−1(φm) if m < m∗.
(12)
Proof. See Lagos and Wright (2005).
Let λ denote the Lagrangian multiplier of Equation (10); then λ = u
′(q)
v′ (q)
− 1 is also
the liquidity premium for money. If Equation (10) is not binding, λ will be 0, and B
will acquire optimal DM consumption q∗. Otherwise, λ is a positive number, and the
buyer cannot receive optimal DM consumption due to a money shortage. Let λ1, λ2,
and λ3 denote the liquidity premium for type 1, 2, and 3 meetings. Then λ3 ≥ λ1,λ2,
because B has no additional money to use in type 3.
3.3 OTC bargaining
Now I study the terms of trade in OTC markets. H becomes B or N. B requires more
money while N desires more assets. There are two types of meeting: the type 1 meeting
in which B and N trade, and the type 2 meeting in which B and N trade via M. There
are three types of bargaining in the OTC market. B bargains with N in the type 1
meeting; B bargains with M in the type 2 meeting; and N also bargains with M in the
type 2 meeting as well.
Before considering the bargaining process, I define the scarcity of assets as seen in
Lemma 3:
Lemma 3. ∃A˜, if A ≥ A˜, ψ = ψ∗ = ρr (ψ∗ is the fundamental price). Otherwise, ψ > ψ∗ for
some i. The scarcity of assets means A < A˜.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Given the scarcity of assets, I consider the type 1 bargaining problem. Let θ1 denote
N’s bargaining power in type 1 meetings and TBN denote the total benefit of B and N’s
trading:
max
a1,m1
TBN = [Vdb (mˆ+m1, aˆ− a1, 0)−Vdb (mˆ, aˆ, 0)] + [Vdn (mˆ−m1, aˆ+ a1, 0)−Vdn (mˆ, aˆ, 0)]
(13)
st a1 ≤ aˆ; m1 ≤ mˆ; (14)
θ1TBN = (ψ+ ρ)a1. (15)
To receive money from N, B must hold assets. As a result, B will suffer from the
feasibility constraint (14).
One particular property of this bargaining process is worth emphasizing: the level
of assets is relevant when transferring money. Equation (15) is the key equation to
understand the role of assets. Assets are the medium of exchange for money realloca-
tion. How much money is transferred depends on A, the level of assets in circulation.
If Equation (15) is not binding (B has sufficient assets), then B will achieve m∗, or B
will borrow all available money. Otherwise, B cannot acquire sufficient money due to
the shortage of assets.
Now I consider the type 2 meetings, where B and N trade via M. M trades on behalf
of its client in the inter-dealer market. Let i2 denote the interest rate in the inter-dealer
market. The inter-dealer market money supply is ξ(1− γ)mˆ, which is N’s total money
holdings in the market. N needs to acquire assets when it trades. The level of assets is
defined as ξγaˆ, which is B’s total asset holdings in the market. If the level of assets is
insufficient, this shortage of assets will lead to inefficienct money reallocation.
Consider the bargaining process between M and N. Let θN2 denote N’s bargaining
power in type 2 meetings. N wants to buy assets to receive a return. The total money
supply in type 2 MN should satisfy the following equation:
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(1+ θN2 i2)φMN ≤ ξγ(ψ+ ρ)a1 (16)
Then B will receive MNξγ , which is determined by the market equilibrium. Let TBM
denote the total benefit of B and M’s trading and θM2 denote M’s bargaining power in
a type 2 meeting between B and M. I represent B and M’s bargaining as follows:
max
a2,m2
TBM = [Vdb (mˆ + m2, aˆ− a1, d)−Vdb (mˆ, aˆ, 0)] + (ψ+ ρ)a1 − (1+ i2)φm2 (17)
st a1 ≤ aˆ; m2 = MN
ξγ
. (18)
The results of OTC bargaining are summarized in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Given A and φ, there exists i∗j (j = 1, 2), satisfying:
mˆ + mj
 = m
∗ if i ≤ i∗j
< m∗ if i > i∗j
And
∂i∗j
∂A > 0 when there is a scarcity of assets.
Proof. See the appendix.
B can achieve m∗ in type 1 and type 2 meetings when nominal interest rates are low
enough. However, most papers follow the example of Lagos and Wright (2005), which
claims that this result can be obtained only under the Friedman rule: i=0. The special
mechanism at work in this model is the uncertainty of OTC markets. H may enter a
no-meeting case in the OTC markets; as a result, H wants to retain more money on the
CM to create a precautionary savings pool in case the worst case scenario is realized. If
H knows that it has definite access to a banker (Berentson et al., 2007), H will decrease
its money holdings and fail to achieve m∗.
When the nominal interest rate is low, B holds a relatively large amount of money
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in its portfolio, and requires only slightly more money to obtain optimal consumption.
Although the level of assets in circulation is limited, it is already sufficient to ensure
that B acquires m∗. When the nominal interest rate is high, B cannot obtain m∗ due
to the shortage of assets or the shortage of the money supply. Higher A in circulation
improves the allocation.
3.4 Government budget
Now I consider the government’s budget constraint. The government collects real tax
and inflation tax to finance its expenditures, and its budget constraint is represented
as follows:
G + ψAˆg = Tr + (ψ+ ρ)Ag + φ[Mt+1 −Mt] (19)
where G is government spending, Tr is the tax in term of x, and Aˆg represents the gov-
ernment asset holding for the next period. The government holds real assets; it uses
dividends from assets to pay government bills, or it collects less tax. The government
balances its budget every time period.
The two policy variables are the nominal interest rate, i, and the level of assets in
circulation, A. The government controls these two variables by changing Mt+1 and
Ag. It injects money into the economy by initiating a lump-sum transfer to control the
money growth rate µ, which is equivalent to i. Meanwhile, the government could also
use money to buy assets (QE) or sell assets for money; these actions cause the levels of
money and assets in circulation to fluctuate.
3.5 Equilibrium
In this section, I describe the equilibrium, focusing on steady state equilibria, where all
Hs have the same money and asset holdings,11 and the real variables will be constant
over time. A steady state equilibrium is defined in Definition 1.
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium is a state in which, given i, A, a list of m, a, d,
11Following Lagos and Wright (2005), households have the same money and asset holdings.
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and prices satisfy the following:
(1) aˆ and mˆ solve H’s problem;
(2) the government balances its budget;
(3) m1, a1, m2, a2, and d are bargaining solutions;
(4) prices (φ, ψ, i2) clear markets.
Then Lemma 5 describes the existence and uniqueness of a steady state equilib-
rium:
Lemma 5. In this model, a unique steady state equilibrium exists.
Proof. See the appendix.
4 Policy
4.1 Liquidity and welfare
I examine the effects of monetary policies in this chapter, focusing on consumption,
liquidity, and welfare. First, consider the effects of the nominal interest rate, i, which
is equivalent to the money growth rate, µ. The effect of i on real money balances zt is
described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let zt = φmt denote real money balances, then ∂zt∂i < 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
Real money balances zt decrease with the nominal interest rate, i, which is the cost
of holding money.12 This is not a surprising result; a higher inflation tax leads to lower
money holdings, and therefore, to greater money demand when H turns to B. B with
no OTC meetings uses its own money to purchase in next DM. I call these agents type
3 buyers. Other Bs have an OTC trade with N or M. We call the meeting with N the
type 1 meeting, and the meeting with M the type 2 meeting. DM consumption is
12The only cost of holding money is the inflation tax here. However, it is also worth mentioning that
one disadvantage of money is that it may be more susceptible to loss or theft, as in He et al. (2005, 2008)
or Sanches and Williamson (2010). I leave this consideration for future research.
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heterogeneous in these three types. Figure 4 shows the relationship between i and DM
consumption in the three types for a given assets level, A. The solid line represents B’s
DM consumption in type 2 meetings, the dashed line denotes B’s DM consumption in
type 1 meetings, and the dotted line denotes B’s DM consumption with no OTC trade.
Figure 4: DM consumption in three OTC types
Type 3 B has no additional money and therefore consumes fewest DM goods. Type
1 B can acquire money from one N while type 2 B has access to N’s money via the
inter-dealer market. Therefore, type 2 could obtain a larger amount of money than
the other two types can. When the nominal interest rate is low, B can obtain enough
money to buy q∗ in both type 1 and type 2 meetings.
I calculate the weighted average of all three types of DM consumption to derive the
overall effects. The weighted average is qw = α1bq1 + α
2
bq2 + α
3
bq3, which is a straight-
forward indicator of consumption; and hence, of welfare and liquidity. Higher qw
translates into higher welfare and liquidity. From this point forward in the analysis, I
consider the relationship between qw and monetary policies, beginning with the nom-
inal interest rate, i.
qw measures welfare and liquidity, due to the quasi-linear utility setup. If policy
changes (cutting interest rates and QE) take place, CM consumption x will be constant,
and the total amount of labor will stay the same. These results follow Lagos and
Wright (2005). Therefore, the overall CM consumption and labor are independent of
policies. We then focus on the DM consumption to measure welfare and liquidity. A
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higher qw indicates higher liquidity and welfare.
Figure 5: The nominal interest rate and weighted DM consumption
Figure 5 shows the relationship between qw and i. The curve in Figure 5 slopes
downward. At a low level of inflation, although B can acquire q∗ in type 1 and 2
meetings, B’s weighted consumption still decreases due to the drop of the type 3 con-
sumption. The effect of cutting the nominal interest rate is very clear: It increases
consumption, and hence, liquidity and welfare.
In considering QE, I will focus on decreasing asset levels to align with the Federal
Reserve’s actions in the real world. Proposition 2 summarizes the effects of QE.
Proposition 2. ∀A, there exist two cutoffs, i˜1 and i˜2, if i˜1 < i < i˜2; QE decreases DM
consumption and thereby decreases liquidity and welfare.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 6 illustrates the effect of QE, which lowers the level of assets in circula-
tion. The solid line represents B’s weighted DM consumption before QE, whereas the
dashed line denotes B’s weighted DM consumption after QE.
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Figure 6: QE and weighted DM consumption
To explain Propositon 2 in more detail, I examine DM consumption in all OTC
types. Type 3 B’s DM consumption is not affected because it finds no trade in the OTC
market. DM consumption in type 1 or type 2 OTC meetings is more complex. Figure
7 shows the effects of QE on type 1 or type 2 DM consumption. The solid line denotes
B’s type 1 or type 2 DM consumption before QE, whereas the dashed line represents
DM consumption after QE.
Figure 7: QE and Type 2 or Type 3 DM consumption
The figure depicts three parameter regions. In the low and extremely high interest
regions, assets are sufficient, and QE has no effect. When the interest rate is low, the
households themselves carry relatively large amounts of money; they require little
money to obtain m∗. Therefore, a few assets are enough to facilitate all needed OTC
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transactions. In the case of extremely high interest rates, the money supply in the OTC
market is limited. A few assets are sufficiently abundant to obtain all the money in
OTC trades. Assets are sufficient in the two cases above. When assets are sufficient,
QE has no effect because the decreasing level of assets is irrelevant.
When the interest rate is high but not extremely high, there is an adequate money
supply on OTC markets. Then the stock of assets is the most important factor in fa-
cilitation OTC transactions. It is possible that assets are not enough to ensure that B
acquires a satisfying amount of money. And QE makes assets scarcer and money allo-
cation less efficient. These mechanisms, therefore, lower DM consumption and reduce
liquidity.
Figure 8 shows the relationships between this two policies.
Figure 8: Relationships between interest and QE
Interest rates determine money holding and asset demand endogenously. High
inflation leads to a scarcity of assets. If the Federal Reserve employs QE in a particular
region, the liquidity of the economy will decrease because of a decrease of A.
These propositions have new policy implications. First, if the Federal Reserve
wants to keep liquidity high, it should continue the low nominal interest rate policy.
Second, the Federal Reserve should inject liquid assets into the economy to increase
liquidity, rather than injecting money and withdrawing assets.13
13I assume the total stock of assets is fixed. Some assets are in the government’s hands while others
are in circulation. However, it may be interesting to relax this assumption and allow the private sector
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4.2 Asset pricing
I am now prepared to examine how assets are priced and study the effects of QE on
asset pricing. Assets are priced as described in Lemma 6:
Lemma 6. Given the scarcity of assets, the asset price is hump-shaped. If the nominal in-
terest rate, i, is extremely low or very high, assets will be priced fundamentally. Otherwise,
asset prices will be higher than the fundamental price, and they will increase with the nominal
interest rate.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 9 shows how asset prices change with the nominal interest rate.
Figure 9: Asset pricing
The effects of QE on asset pricing are summarized in Proposition 3, taking the asset
pricing curve into account.
Proposition 3. QE decreases the level of assets in circulation, A. If the nominal interest rate,
i, is low or very high, assets will be priced fundamentally. Otherwise, the price of assets will
increase.
Proof. See the appendix.
and the government to produce liquid assets and inject them in the economy, as noted in Gorton and
Ordonez (2013) and Williamson (2014a, 2014b). They suggest that the government should issue more
treasury bills, which are considered safe and accepted in transactions. I will leave this asset creation
and fiscal policy project for future study.
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The effects of QE on asset pricing are shown in Figure 10. The dotted line represents
the asset pricing curve before QE, and the solid line denotes the asset pricing curve
after QE.
Figure 10: QE and asset pricing
Asset prices are related to the liquidity of the economy. When assets are sufficient
to meet needs in OTC markets, assets will be priced fundamentally. This is true during
both low and high inflation periods. Otherwise, assets are scarce and carry a liquidity
premium, which translates to higher asset prices. When QE decreases A, assets be-
come scarcer and asset prices rise. These high prices result from an asset shortage in
OTC markets, which leads to inefficient money allocation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I study two monetary policies, cutting interest rates and QE, in a gen-
eral equilibrium model with frictional OTC markets. OTC markets serve to reallo-
cate money across agents.14 Through this research, I discover new findings regarding
the implementation of QE. Traditional monetary wisdom, such as the IS-LM model
14Money is needed here to buy consumption goods (Lagos and Wright 2005; Rocheteau and Wright
2005); however, money demand can also be generated to buy inputs of productions (Silveira and Wright
2010; Mattesini and Nosal 2013), in which case the benefit represents the profit function of firms, not the
utility function of households. Then agents need to reallocate money when an investment opportunity,
rather than a consumption opportunity, arises.
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or the relatively morden market segmentation models, states that raising money lev-
els increases liquidity in the economy, whereas I find that the level of liquid assets is
the significant factor affecting allocations, from the perspective of OTC market effi-
ciency. A higher level of assets leads to a more efficient money allocation—and hence
increases welfare and liquidity.
I also examine the relationship between cutting interest rates and QE. The nominal
interest rate determines the demand for assets. If the nominal interest rate is above a
cutoff, OTC markets will suffer from a scarcity of assets. Given the scarcity, QE de-
creases asset levels furthermore, which leads to assets becoming scarcer and carrying
a larger liquidity premium. These higher asset prices reflect lower consumption.
This project provides a new perspective on understanding the effect of QE. One
interpretation of this perspective relates to investigating the long-term effects of QE. In
the long run, most economists believe that prices adjust freely in markets. This implies
that economists need to focus on the level of liquidity, instead of the level of money.
When assets are useful (as a medium of exchange or collateral), the government should
not collect these assets and bury them in the New York Federal Reserve. My policy
recommendation is that the government should channel these useful assets back into
the market, rather than injecting money, which only increases price levels.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof of Lemma 3 depends on Lemma 7 and 8:
Lemma 7. If assets do not carry a liquidity premium, assets will be priced fundamentally.
Proof. Consider the Euler equation for asset holding:
(1+ r)ψ−1 = (ψ+ ρ) + γαbα1b(1− θ1)
∂TBN
∂a
+ γαbα
2
b(1− θM2 )
∂TBM
∂a
, (20)
If assets do not carry a liquidity premium, then ∂TBN∂a =
∂TBM
∂a = 0. Therefore, (1 +
r)ψ−1 = ψ+ ρ. At a steady state equilibrium, ψ−1 = ψ. ψ = ψ∗ = ρ/r .
The amount of money that B needs to achieve m∗ is md = m∗ − zt/φ, where md is
for money demand. The supply of money that each N holds is ms = zt/φ.
Lemma 8. ∃iˆ, s.t. md = ms if i = iˆ.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know ∂zt/∂i < 0; therefore, ∂ms/∂i < 0, and we also
have ∂md/∂i = − ∂zt/∂iφ > 0. Under the Friedman rule, md = 0, ms = m∗. Due to
continuity, we know that a cutoff iˆ exists, st md = ms if i = iˆ. And we also have
md < ms if i < iˆ; whereas md > ms if i > iˆ.
Let TN1 and TN2 denote the benefits that N gets in a type 1 or type 2 trade. Then let
A˜ satisfy ψ∗ A˜ = max{TN1(iˆ), T2(iˆ)}. We need to show that, when A ≥ A˜, assets will
be fundamentally priced under all i.
Now looking at the case i ≤ iˆ, from the proof of Lemma 8, we know φmd ≤ zt(iˆ).
That is, money supply in OTC markets is sufficient to satisfy agents’ needs. Assets are
sufficient to acquire all the money N holds.. Therefore, B achieves m∗. Assets carry
no liquidity premium. We know that assets are priced fundamentally due to Lemma
7. When i > iˆ, then φms ≤ zt(iˆ); therefore, assets carry no liquidity premium because
there is no remaining money. B obtains all the money available in OTC markets. Then
assets are priced fundamentally due to Lemma 7, and Lemma 3 holds. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 4. It is easy to show that buyers cannot get m∗ if i is high (see proof
of Lemma 3), so instead, I focus here on the low inflation case. The proof of Lemma 4
depends on Lemma 9:
Lemma 9. Given 0 < A < A˜; ∃i1(A), i2(A), st ψ∗A ≥ max{TN1[i(A)], TN2[i(A)]} if
i < i1(A) or i ≥ i2(A). Then ψ = ψ∗ if i < i1(A) or i ≥ i2(A).
Proof. See proof of Lemma 8.
We know that if i1(A) < iˆ, money supply will be sufficient to achieve m∗, and if
i ≤ i1(A), assets will be sufficient to achieve m∗. Therefore, the feasibility constraints
in type 1 and type 2 are not binding if i ≤ i1(A); B achieves m∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5. To prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, I depend
on the results of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. Given real money balances zt, the prices
(φ, ψ, i2) and allocations (m1, a1, m2, a2, d) are determined. Therefore, the existence
and uniqueness of zt is sufficient to show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 show that zt is unique. Therefore, I can prove the existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6. The proof of Lemma 6 depends on Lemma 7 and Lemma 9.
Lemma 7 shows that when assets carry no liquidity premium, assets are priced fun-
damentally. Lemma 9 shows that in cases of low and extremely high inflation, assets
are sufficiently abundant, ψ = ψ∗. When inflation is neither too low nor too high, in-
creasing the interest rate leads to a higher liquidity premium; see Venkateswaran and
Wright (2013) for the proof. This is the Mundell-Tobin effect. At the higher interest
cutoff i2(A), where assets are sufficient to capture all the OTC money, asset prices will
jump to the fundamental prices. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. The Euler equation for money holding is needed to prove
this proposition:
1+ i = 1+ (1− γ)(α1lΛ1θ1
∂TBN
∂m
+ α2lΛ2θ
N
2 i2) + γαb[α
1
bλ1 + α
2
bλ2 + α
3
bλ3], (21)
where Λ1 and Λ2 are indicators of whether nonbuyers have sufficient cash in type 1
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and type 2 OTC trades. Equation (21) should hold at any i.
Proposition 1 is demonstrated through proof by contradiction techniques. First,
I examine the Λ1 = Λ2 = 0 case, simplifying the Euler equation above as 1 + i =
1 + γαb[α1bλ1 + α
2
bλ2 + α
3
bλ3]. Then I assume that i˜ exists, satisfying, ∂z/∂i ≥ 0 if
i=i˜. I look at the interest rate i′ = i˜ + δ, where δ is a small, positive number; due
to the principle of continuity, z(i′) ≤ z(i˜). Then the RHS of Equation (21) does not
decrease with i. Because zt determines consumption allocations in all three types, a
higher zt means a lower λ. However, the LHS of Equation (21) strictly increases with
i. The strictly increasing LHS and the nonincreasing RHS cannot coexist, and hence,
Equation (21) cannot hold at i′; this is a contradiction. Therefore, real money balance zt
is not strictly decreasing if Λ1 = Λ2 = 0. Using a similar methodology, we can prove
the real money balance is strictly decreasing with i if Λ1 = 1 , Λ2 = 0, Λ1 = 0 , Λ2 = 1,
and Λ1 = Λ2 = 0 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of Proposition 2 depends on Lemma 4, Equation
15, and Equation 16. There are three parameter regions in Proposition 2. First, I focus
on the low interest rate region. Let i˜1= min{i∗1 ,i∗2}. Lemma 4 shows that B acquires
m∗ in both type 1 and type 2 OTC meetings. Therefore, Equations 15 and 16 are not
binding. QE decreases A, but B still obtains m∗ due to these nonbinding constraints;
therefore, QE has no effect. Asset levels are sufficient. Now I consider the extremely
high nominal interest rate region. B cannot achieve m∗ there. However, B acquires all
available money in both type 1 and type 2 meetings. Then QE has no effect because no
money remains. Finally, I consider the region where inflation is high but not extremely
high; then Equation 15 or Equation 16 is binding. A lower A leads to less money being
transferred in OTC markets; and lower weighted DM consumption. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of Proposition 3 requires the Euler equation for
asset holding:
(1+ r)ψ−1 = (ψ+ ρ) + γαbα1b(1− θ1)
∂TBN
∂a
+ γαbα
2
b(1− θM2 )
∂TBM
∂a
,
LHS is the cost of holding one extra unit of assets, whereas RHS is the benefit of
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holding an extra unit of assets. If the interest is very low, B acquires q∗. Then ∂TBN∂a = 0
and ∂TBM∂a = 0 .That is, assets carry no liquidity premium. If the interest is extremely
high, the OTC money supply will be limited, and assets will carry no liquidity pre-
mium due to the shortage of money. Otherwise, we have ∂TBN∂a > 0,
∂2TBN
∂a∂A > 0; and
∂TBM
∂a > 0,
∂2TBM
∂a∂A > 0 from FOC and SOC. In other words, the asset price is above the
fundamental price, and prices of assets increase when QE decreases A in the economy.
Q.E.D.
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